Labor Law

Protect Us, Lord, from Richard Epstein

Jonah Gelbach & Lesley Wexler & Jonathan Klick

This article is a response to an earlier posted piece by Richard Epstein: Protect Us, Lord, from Title VII: A Response to Gelbach, Klick, and Wexler.
We thank Richard Epstein for commenting on our online Article. He brings a unique perspective to the field of employment discrimination and pushes other scholars… Read More »

Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression

Helen Norton - University of Colorado School of Law

Government increasingly claims the power to control its employees’ expression to protect its own speech, a trend that imperils the public’s interest in transparent government as well as the free speech rights of more than twenty million government workers. In the past, courts interpreted the First Amendment to permit governmental… Read More »

A Formal Model of Passive Discrimination

Jonah Gelbach & Lesley Wexler & Jonathan Klick

In this Editorial, we present a basic, one-period microeconomic model in which equilibrium occurs in both perfectly competitive labor markets and goods markets. This piece is a companion to our earlier Legal Workshop Editorial, Passive Discrimination, which was posted on June 22, 2009. Because all hypothesized workers are equally productive,… Read More »

Protect Us, Lord, from Title VII: A Response to Gelbach, Klick, and Wexler

Richard A. Epstein - University of Chicago Law School

In their recent article, Passive Discrimination, Jonah Gelbach, Jonathan Klick, and Lesley Wexler (hereafter “GKW”) offer yet another way to pile additional liabilities on hapless employers for race or sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Their article is ingenious because it identifies a mechanism—previously discussed… Read More »

Passive Discrimination

Jonah Gelbach & Lesley Wexler & Jonathan Klick

In this Editorial, we present a distinct mechanism of employer discrimination largely ignored by scholars and regulators alike.  What we term “passive discrimination” involves an employer’s use of wage and benefits packages that exploit observed, systematic group-level preference heterogeneity in order to induce worker sorting such that members of a… Read More »

Welcome to Legal Workshop

New York University & Stanford University

Below is a brief introduction to the Legal Workshop project. We hope you enjoy getting to know us, and we welcome your feedback.
 
Mission:
The Legal Workshop website provides a single online forum for cutting-edge legal scholarship from the top law journals in the country.
The Legal Workshop features… Read More »